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“And verily it is naturally given to all men to esteem their own inventions best.”
— Sir Thomas More, in Utopia, Book 1, 1516 AD.
Abstract
We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use
strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for sev-
eral problems, including the design of externality resistant auctions and a variant of multi-
dimensional scheduling.
1 Introduction
1.1 Externalities
Mechanisms with externalities, and specifically altruism and spite, but also others (“the joy of
winning”, “malice”), have been studied at length in the literature. Experiments seem to indicate
that both altruism and spite have an observable effect, and various theoretical models have been
proposed to deal with this issue.
We quote higher authority (Cooper and Fang [15]) in the context of 2nd price auctions:
“We found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their
rivals to have similar values, supporting a modified ‘joy of winning’ hypothesis but large overbids
are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values, consistent
with the ‘spite’ hypothesis.”
A partial list of (experimental and theoretical) references dealing with externalities is [19, 21, 22,
18, 8, 24, 25, 4, 30, 8, 23, 15, 13, 12, 10, 11]. The questions addressed in previous work primarily deal
with the impact of externalities on the equilibria, e.g., observing that externalities such as “the joy or
winning” or “spite” lead to overbidding in some auction mechanisms, or that externalities modeled
as altruism lead to more-or-less balanced outcomes in the ultimatum game, although neither of
these phenomena would be considered “reasonable” if one assumes no externalities. In recent years,
the price of anarchy as impacted by such externalities has also been the subject of much research,
e.g., malice in congestion games [25, 4, 30].
In this paper we consider a somewhat different goal: we seek to devise mechanisms that overcome
externalities. As a basic motivating example consider an auction selling a single item. The Vickrey
second-price auction is dominant strategy incentive compatible. But, try to imagine that the bidders
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who lose are spiteful towards the winner (although this is really hard to believe). They may have
reason to increase their bid so as to increase the payment by the winning agent.
Even more worrisome — say that the only spiteful losers are those who took part in the various
experimental psychology studies cited above, and they did so only so as to mislead the researchers.
In fact, we who reside in Utopia will never, ever, encounter spite. This is a fact, but it does not
imply that everyone believes that it is so, it does not imply that everyone believes that everyone
believes that it is so, it does not imply that this is common knowledge. Ergo, just the concept
of spite (transmitted via the apple from the Garden of Eden), even if in fact there are no spiteful
bidders, implies that bidders may have an incentive not to bid truthfully in the VCG mechanism.
So, why not define the agent type to include all possible externalities and then run VCG? There
are two problems here: (1) It is impossible; payments to one agent impact the utility of another, we
are no longer in the quasi-linear setting, (2) Ignoring the former concern (i.e., impossibility), what
social welfare are we optimizing? Is it our goal to pander to the spiteful masses? Offer them bread
and circuses? Execute the winners during the lunch break of the Gladiatorial games? There are
indications from the lives of the Caesars that this may actually maximize (spiteful) social welfare.
So, the very existence of the concept of spite seems to threaten the fundamentals of mechanism
design.
To address these issues, we study an alternative utility model: We assume that agents have two
utility functions, a base utility, and an externality-modified utility which is a linear combination of
other agent utilities. Variants of this model appear in Ledlard [21], Levine [22], Chen and Kempe
[13, 12, 10], and many other papers. The PhD thesis of Chen [10] includes numerous relevant papers.
1.2 Externality Resistant Mechanisms
We present a new type of private value mechanism, rVCG. Assume that it is common knowledge
that no one is willing to lose more than (say) γ = 5 cents so as to increase another’s payment by
$1. Now:
1. Agents using the rVCG mechanism are sure that the following two values are approximately
equal:
• The utility they obtain under rVCG, in an imperfect world, where externalities are real,
and demons roam the earth.
• The utility they would have obtained under VCG, in an imaginary, Utopian world, where
externalities did not exist. (See Theorem 3.1).
I.e., given a bound, γ, on the altruism/spite, the rVCG mechanism approximates Utopia, as
promised in the title.1
2. On the other hand, irrespective of how infinitesimally small γ > 0 may be, a losing bidder in
a second-price auction, may, out of spite, even infintesimally small spite, reduce the winner’s
profit to zero. (This holds in the more general VCG mechanism as well).
1.3 Strongly Truthful Mechanisms
To achieve externality resistant mechanisms we make use of strongly truthful mechanisms. These
are mechanisms where it is not only a weakly dominant strategy to be truthful but where one
gets punished for lying. The goal in the design of strongly truthful mechanisms is to increase
1Admittedly, the bound γ has to be very small in order to truly approximate Utopia.
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the punishment as much as possible. Strongly truthful mechanisms are related to strongly convex
mechanisms, analogous to the connection between truthful mechanisms and convex utility functions,
(see, e.g., Archer and Kleinberg, [2, 1]).
For bounded domains, we give (optimal) strongly truthful mechanisms, in this case, the punish-
ment for the lie v˜ = v + δ is O(δ2).
For unbounded domains, we give a mechanism that is relatively strongly truthful where the lie
is measured as a fraction of the truth, and the punishment for the lie v˜ = (1+α)v, where α ∈ Θ(1),
is v/ log1+ǫ v.
Strongly truthful mechanisms can also be used in mechanisms for multi-dimensional problems
such as makespan minimization for unrelated machines, see below.
This idea of combining multiple mechanisms to boost truthfulness appears in [28], where it
is used to derive truthful mechanisms for some problems via differential privacy. It also appears
implicitly in the context of scoring rules [9, 6], and in the related responsive lotteries [16] so as to
determine the true utility of an outcome. However, we are unaware of previous attempts to quantify
the quality of such devices, nor are we aware of other attempts to apply them towards externality
resistance or for multidimensional problems.
In the appendix we describe transformations between strongly truthful mechanisms and proper
scoring rules. This automatically implies transformations between strongly truthful mechanisms,
market scoring rules, responsive lotteries, and market maker pricing algorithms to provide liquidity
for prediction markets [17, 31, 14].
1.4 The Solution Concept
Adapting a solution concept from Babaioff, Lavi and Pavlov, [5], from approximation problems to
arbitrary predicates, we say that a mechanism M is an algorithmic implementation of a predicate
P in undominated strategies, if, for all agents i, there exists a set of strategies, Di, such that
1. The output of M satisfies P , for any combination of strategies from
∏
jDj , and,
2. For all i, for any agent i strategy, s /∈ Di, there exists some strategy s
′ ∈ Di that is strictly
better for agent i than strategy s, irrespective of what strategies are chosen by the other
agents.
I.e., predicate P is implemented by a mechanism in undominated strategies, if, in the game
defined by the mechanism, and as long as no agent chooses a strategy that is obviously dominated
(for arbitrary assumptions about the types of other agents, e.g., values, bids, externalities), predicate
P holds for the outcome of the mechanism.
In the context of externality resistant auctions, as long as agents do not bid stupidly (do not
use a strategy that is obviously dominated), externality resistance holds.
In fact, any strategy that entails bidding “too far away” from the truth is dominated by bidding
truthfully, where “too far away” for agent i is a function of her own externalities γij (see Section 3
for a definition of these externalities). Moreover, agents can efficiently determine that bidding far
from the truth is dominated by truthful bidding. Thus, Di is contained in the set of all bids whose
distance from the truth is not too big. Note that we don’t make any claim on the precise strategies
that will be adapted by the agents.
1.5 Other Applications
We can also use strongly truthful mechanisms to achieve goals such as minimizing the makespan in a
multi dimensional machine scheduling problem, the infamous Nisan-Ronen problem, see [27, 20, 3].
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This magic is achieved by changing the problem, and allowing one to repeatedly assign the same
job to a machine. So, choosing to verify the truthfullness of the agent types can be done by choosing
at random, with some small probability, a target agent, and using strongly truthful mechanisms to
punish the agent for misrepresentation of his type.
Given a sufficiently large punishment, all agents will have incentive to stick close to the truth. So,
with high probability, the mechanism will achieve a close approximation to the minimum makespan
in undominated strategies..
This is quite general and can be used in other multi-dimensional settings where one can boost
truth extraction by repetition.
2 Strongly Truthful Mechanisms
A key ingredient in our constructions is the notion of a strongly truthful mechanism. In this section,
we define strongly truthful mechanisms for single dimensional problems and one agent. As discussed
below, these definitions and results extend to multi-dimensional and multi-agent settings.
Consider a single dimensional agent with private value (type) v for receiving a good or service.
A direct revelation mechanism takes as input some (possibly false) value, v˜, computes a payment,
p(v˜), and allocates the good to the agent with probability a(v˜).
The standard quasilinear utility of an agent whose true value is v, but reports value v˜ (possibly
different from v), is denoted by
uv(v˜) = v · a(v˜)− p(v˜). (1)
We also define
u(v) = uv(v),
i.e., the utility to the agent with value v when truthfully reporting v˜ = v.
In this setting, it follows from Myerson [26], that a mechanism is truthful in expectation if and
only if
• the allocation probability function a(v) is monotone nondecreasing, and
• the payment function is
p(v) = va(v) −
∫ v
0
a(x)dx+ p(0),
for some constant p(0). (We will take p(0) = 0 herein).
It follows from the above and from Equation 1 that
uv(v˜) = v · a(v˜)− v˜ · a(v˜) +
∫ v˜
0
a(x)dx
= (v − v˜) · a(v˜) +
∫ v˜
0
a(x)dx.
Thus, for truthful in expectation mechanisms, it must be that
1. The utility function u(v) is convex (the integral of a nondecreasing function).
2. The allocation function a(v) = u′(v) (where u is differentiable).
3. Any convex function u(v) whose subgradient, u′(v), lies in the range [0, 1], can be interpreted
as the utility function for an associated truthful in expectation mechanism.
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4. Ergo, if restricting oneself to truthful in expectation mechanisms, one can describe a mech-
anism using utility functions or allocation functions interchangeably. (Up to additive con-
stants).
We seek to strengthen the notion of truthfulness in expectation so that the greater the deviation
from the truth, the greater the loss in utility.
To this end, we define c-strongly truthful mechanisms as follows:
Definition 2.1. A mechanism with utility function u is called c-strongly truthful if for every v and
v˜:
uv(v) − uv(v˜) ≥
1
2
c |v˜ − v|2. (2)
This definition enables us to extend the connection between truthfulness and convexity to
strongly truthful mechanisms. For this, recall the standard notion of strong convexity. For a
differentiable function f(x), convexity is equivalent to:
∀x, x′ f(x)− f(x′) ≥ f ′(x′) · (x− x′).
The following notion is also standard [7]:
Definition 2.2. Let m ≥ 0. A function f is called m-strongly convex if and only if for every x, x′:
f(x)− f(x′) ≥ f ′(x′) · (x− x′) +
1
2
m |x− x′|2 (3)
By defining strong truthfulness as in Equation (2) the following proposition holds:
Lemma 2.3. A mechanism with utility function u(v) is m-strongly truthful if and only if u(v) is
m-strongly convex.
Proof. Applying equation (1) to uv(v˜) and uv˜(v˜), we get
uv˜(v˜)− uv(v˜) = u
′(v˜) · (v˜ − v).
It follows that
uv(v) − uv(v˜) = uv(v)− uv˜(v˜) + u
′(v˜) · (v˜ − v) = u(v)− u(v˜) + u′(v˜) · (v˜ − v) (4)
Since by definition, the mechanism ism-strongly truthful if and only if uv(v)−uv(v˜) ≥
1
2m |v˜−v|
2, we
derive that the mechanism ism-strongly truthful if and only if u(v)−u(v˜)+u′(v˜)·(v˜−v) ≥ 12m |v˜−v|
2,
which is precisely the definition that u(v) is m-strongly convex.
Remark: All of the definitions in this section extend naturally to multi-dimensional agents. Indeed,
the three equivalent definitions of a doubly differentiable function being convex (the standard one,
cycle monotonicity, and the Hessian being positive semidefinite) have analogues when discussing
truthful multidimensional mechanisms over convex domains [7, 29]. Similarly, the equivalent notions
of strong-convexity and strong truthfulness extend mutatis mutandis.
It follows from the above theorem that the question of finding the strongest truthful mechanism
is an extremal question about strongly convex functions whose partial derivatives satisfy appropriate
constraints that capture the constraints of the allocation probabilities (for example, for the single
item case the constraint is the derivative of the utility is in [0, 1]).
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2.1 Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Single Agent, Single Item Auctions
Consider the case in which we want to find the strongest truthful mechanism for a single player and
one item. (We will use this in the next section.) To start, assume that the agent’s value is bounded:
v ∈ [L,H]. For this case, we define the linear mechanism:
Definition 2.4. The linear mechanism for the single player/single item setting has allocation rule
a(v) = (v − L)/(H − L), and applies when the player’s value is known to be in the range [L,H].
Theorem 2.5. The linear mechanism for a player whose value v satisfies v ∈ [L,H] is a 1/(H−L)-
strongly truthful mechanism. No other mechanism is m-strongly truthful for m ≥ 1/(H − L).
Proof. It is straightforward to check that for the linear mechanism, the utility function u(v) is
(v−L)2
2(H−L) . We can directly verify that Equation (3) in the definition of strong convexity holds with
equality for all v, with m = 1/(H − L). Indeed, we derive the following equivalences
u(z)− u(y) = u′(y) · (z − y) +
1
2
m |z − y|2
(z − L)2
2(H − L)
−
(y − L)2
2(H − L)
=
y − L
H − L
(z − y) +
1
2
1
H − L
(z − y)2
(z − y)(z + y − 2L)
2(H − L)
=
(z − y)(2(y − L) + (z − y))
2(H − L)
;
the last equality clearly holds.
We now show that this is the strongest truthful mechanism. From the definition of strong
convexity for the extreme values of the domain, we get
u(H)− u(L) ≥ u′(L)(H − L) +
1
2
m(H − L)2
u(L)− u(H) ≥ u′(H)(L−H) +
1
2
m(L−H)2
Adding these two, we get that
(H − L)(u′(H)− u′(L)) ≥ m(H − L)2
Since u′(L), and u′(H) are in [0, 1] (they represent allocations), we get that m ≤ 1/(H − L).
Remarks:
• There is a direct connection between single-agent truthful mechanisms and scoring rules (see
e.g., [6]). Indeed, one can define a notion of strongly proper scoring rules that is analogous
to a strongly truthful mechanism. We note that the mechanism just described is in fact the
well-known quadratic scoring rule.
• Definition 2.4 and Theorem 2.5 can easily be generalized to the case of one player and many
items with additive valuations. In this case the utility is u(v) =
∑m
j=1
(vj−L)2
2(H−L) , for which
m = 1
n(H−L) .
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2.2 Relative strong truthfulness
If we want to consider unbounded domains, it follows from Theorem 2.5 that no m-strongly truthful
mechanism exists with m > 0.
For such domains, it may be useful to define a notion of relative strong truthfulness as follows:
Definition 2.6. We say a mechanism M is f(v, α)-relatively truthful if, for all v˜ such that v˜ 6∈
[v(1 − α), v(1 + α)]
uv(v)− uv(v˜)
uv(v)
≥ f(v, α).
For example, it is easy to show that the single agent mechanism with allocation rule a(v) =
1− 1ln v +
1
ln2 v
(and payment p(v) = v
ln2(v)
) satisfies f(v, α) = Ω( α
2
log2 v
). Slightly better mechanisms
that approach f(v, α) = Ω( α
2
log v ) exist
2.
3 Externality Resistant Auctions
In this section, we consider how strongly truthful, or truth-extraction mechanisms can be used to
help cope with spiteful or altruistic bidders. Our goal is to ensure that a bidder participating in,
say, an auction for a single item, does not need to worry about her competitor purposely bidding
high just so as to make her pay a lot.
We consider the setting where an auctioneer wishes to maximize social welfare, and each agent
has a value vi for being one of the winners in the auction. Of course, in the standard version of this
setting, the mechanism of choice would be the VCG mechanism.
As we have already discussed however, the VCG mechanism is entirely vulnerable to spiteful
agents. Before explaining the alternative we propose, we define a utility model for externalities that
captures precisely what we mean when we speak about spiteful and altruistic agents.
In the externality-modified setting, agent i’s type ti consists of
• vi, her value for service; and
• a set of externality parameters γij for all j 6= i. Intuitively, γij represents how much agent
i cares about the utility of agent j. A large, negative value means that i is significantly
motivated by the desire to decrease agent j’s utility, whereas a large, positive value means
that i seeks to increase agent j’s utility. A value of zero means that i is indifferent towards j.
Let M be an arbitrary mechanism for the single-parameter allocation problem under considera-
tion. The mechanism takes as input a bid bi from each agent (which is equal to vi if the mechanism
is truthful) and produces as output an allocation x, where xi is the probability that agent i receives
service, and payments p, with pi the expected payment by agent i. Note that both xi = xi(b) and
pi = pi(b) are functions of the bids. The allocation selected must satisfy the feasibility constraints
of the setting, however, we do assume, that having only a single arbitrary agent receive service is
feasible.
2The following sequence of mechanisms are defined for every k > 1 and approach f(v, α) = Ω( α
2
log v
):
p(v) =
v
lnk v
a(v) = 1−
1
(k − 1) lnk−1 v
+
1
lnk v
p(v) =
v
ln v lnk ln v
a(v) = 1−
1
(k − 1) ln v lnk−1 ln v
+
1
ln v lnk ln v
and so on.
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Given bids b−i of all players except player i, the base (standard) utility of agent i, when her
type is ti = (vi, {γi1, . . . , γin}) and her bid is bi, is denoted by u
M
vi
(bi,b−i) and is defined as
uMvi (bi,b−i) = vi xi(b)− pi(b). (5)
Notice that this utility depends only on vi and not on the rest of agent i’s private information
(agent i’s externality parameters γij). This is why we subscript the utility by vi instead of ti.
We define the externality-modified utility ûMti of agent i when the types of the agents are t and
the bids are b as
ûMti (b, t−i) = u
M
vi
(bi,b−i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij u
M
vj
(bj,b−j). (6)
This model (and variants thereof) have been used previously in several papers, e.g. [22, 10].
Note that
• Because the externality-modified utility defined above depends, not only on the bids (or ac-
tions) of other agents, b−i, but also on their types, we add the t−i as an argument to the
utility function, which is atypical. (Of course the only part of t−i the utility depends on is
v−i.)
• The value of t−i is, in general, unknown to agent i, so agent i will be, in general, unable to
compute her externality modified utility ûMti (b, t−i).
• We will be particularly interested in cases where the mechanism M that is being run is VCG,
and then use uVCGvi (b) to denote the standard utility of agent i when her value is vi, the
reported bids are b and the mechanism being run is VCG.
Our goal is to design a mechanism that is externality-resistant, in the following sense:
• The mechanism approximately maximizes social welfare.
• Despite the fact that each agent bids to maximize their externality-modified utility, each agent
ends up with a base utility that is approximately what it would have been had all agents bid
so as to maximize their base utility. Thus, non-spiteful agents are not harmed by the presence
of spiteful agents. Furthermore, the auctioneer’s revenue is not harmed by the presence of
altruistic agents.
An immediate difficulty that arises is the fact that our utility model is non-quasi linear. Our ap-
proach is to consider a weaker solution concept, implementation in undominated strategies, formally
defined as follows.
In a game of incomplete information, a strategy for an agent is a function mapping types to
actions. We say that a strategy s′i for agent i is dominated by strategy si if for all types ti for agent
i, and for all possible types t−i and all possible actions
b−i = s−i(t−i)
of the other agents, the utility of agent i satisfies:
uti(si(ti), b−i, t−i) ≥ uti(s
′
i(ti), b−i, t−i).
A strategy si for agent i is undominated if it is not dominated.
We say that a mechanism implements a predicate P in undominated strategies, if whenever
agents are limited to playing undominated strategies, it must be that predicate P holds.
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We consider the following simple variant of VCG, which we call externality-resistant VCG or
rVCG , for short. The rVCG mechanism, with n agents participating, is parameterized by a value
δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and works as follows:
• Ask the n agents for their values/bids.
• With probability δ/n single out the i-th agent and run the truth extraction mechanism (de-
noted by TE) on him.
• With probability 1− δ, run VCG.
Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 3.1. Consider any single-parameter allocation setting in which the n agents true values
vi are all in the range [0, 1]. Let γ denote maxij γij . Then, for any n, δ, ǫ, and γij such that
γ <
ǫ δ
8 (1− δ)2 n3
,
mechanism rVCG above implements the following predicate in undominated strategies:
For all agents i, and for all types t, the base utility obtained under the rVCG mechanism is
close to the base utility obtained by agent i when all agents bid truthfully under the “standard” VCG
mechanism. Specifically, for b undominated,
urVCGvi (b) ≥ (1− δ)u
VCG
vi
(v) − ǫ.
In the proof below, we use the following notation and definitions:
• For any set of bids b, let MSW(b) denote the maximum social welfare achievable with respect
to the bids b, i.e.
MSW(b) = max
a
∑
j
bj(a).
• We define MSWvi(bi,b−i) to be the maximum social welfare experienced by agent i, when
agent i bids bi, whereas her true value is vi, and all other agents bid b−i. Thus,
MSWvi(bi,b−i) = vi(a
∗) +
∑
j 6=i
bj(a
∗), where a∗ = argmaxa
∑
j
bj(a).
• When agent i bids bi, her true value is vi, all agents but i bid b−i, then, the utility of agent i
under VCG with Clarke Pivot Payments is
uVCGvi (b) = MSWvi(bi,b−i)−MSW(b−i).
We can now turn to the proof of the theorem.
Proof. We assume that agents would like to maximize their externality-modified utility:
ûrVCGti (b, t−i) = (1− δ)û
VCG
ti
(b, t−i) +
δ
n
uTEvi (bi) +∑
j 6=i
γiju
TE
vj
(bj)
 , (7)
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where
ûVCGti (b, t−i) = u
VCG
vi
(b) +
∑
j 6=i
γij
(
uVCGvj (b)
)
. (8)
We say an agent is standard if γij = 0 for all j. Such an agent doesn’t care about the utility
of others. For standard agents, the base utility and the externality-modified utility are the same.
In addition, because VCG is dominant strategy truthful, it is a dominant strategy for the standard
agents to bid truthfully.
So, we only need to understand how non-standard agents will bid. To this end, fix an agent i of
type ti and the bids b−i and types t−i of the other agents.
Suppose that the VCG part of rVCG is executed. Then agent i’s externality-modified utility
ûVCGti (bi,b−i, t−i) is defined by equation (8). We have
uVCGvj (b) = MSWvj (bj,b−j)−MSW(b−j)
and
uVCGvj (bj , vi,b−ij) = MSWvj (bj , vi,b−ij)−MSW(vi,b−i,j).
Thus, the difference between agent i’s externality modified utility when agent i bids bi and when
agent i bids vi is given by
ûVCGti (bi,b−i, t−i)− û
VCG
ti
(vi,b−i, t−i) = MSWvi(bi,b−i)−MSW(vi,b−i)
+
∑
j 6=i
γij
(
MSWvj (bj ,b−j)−MSWvj (bj , vi,b−ij)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
γij (MSW(vi,b−i,j)−MSW(bi,b−i,j))
≤ 2
∑
j 6=i
γijηi
≤ 2(n − 1)γiηi, (9)
where |bi − vi| = ηi and γi = maxj γij .
On the other hand,
ûTEvi (vi)− û
TE
vi
(bi) ≥
1
2
m(bi)|bi − vi|
2 ≥
1
2
η2i , (10)
assuming valuations in the range [0, 1] and the use of the linear TE algorithm. Combining inequal-
ities (9) and (10), we have
ûrVCGti (bi,b−i)− û
rVCG
ti
(vi,b−i) ≤ (1− δ)2(n − 1)γηi −
δ
2n
η2i .
Consider any bid bi for which ηi = |bi − vi| has
(1− δ)2(n − 1)γηi −
δ
2n
η2i < 0.
Then the strategy of bidding truthfully dominates the strategy of bidding this bi. Thus, for all
undominated strategies, it must be that agent i bids a value bi which satisfies:
0 ≤ ûrVCGti (bi,b−i, t−i)− û
rVCG
ti
(vi,b−i, t−i),
10
implying that she will choose ηi so that
0 ≤ (1− δ)2(n − 1)γηi −
δ
2n
η2i ,
and thus
ηi ≤
4(1 − δ)
δ
n2γ. (11)
In other words, lying about vi by more than the right-hand side of Equation (11) is a strategy
dominated by the truth-telling strategy.
From this we can conclude that for any player ℓ who participates in rVCG, if all agents play
undominated strategies, then:
urVCGvℓ (bℓ,b−ℓ) = (1− δ)u
VCG
vℓ
(bℓ,b−ℓ) +
δ
n
uTEvℓ (bℓ)
= (1− δ)
(
uVCGvℓ (vℓ,v−ℓ)−
(
uVCGvℓ (vℓ,v−ℓ)− u
VCG
vℓ
(bℓ,b−ℓ)
))
+
δ
n
uTEvℓ (bℓ)
≥ (1− δ)
(
uVCGvℓ (vℓ,v−ℓ)− 2nη
)
≥ (1− δ)uVCGvℓ (vℓ,v−ℓ)−
8(1 − δ)2
δ
n3γ (12)
where η = maxi ηi.
The following two corollaries are immediate:
Corollary 3.2. When rVCG is used and all players play undominated strategies, the social welfare
of the outcome a∗ selected satisfies ∑
i
vi(a
∗) ≥ MSW(v) − nη.
Corollary 3.3. When rVCG is used and all players play undominated strategies, the profit of the
auctioneer is at least his profit from running VCG with truthful players minus 2nη.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced a number of concepts and taken first steps towards understanding
and applying these concepts. Clearly though, we have only scratched the surface.
For example, the basic tool of strongly truthful mechanisms may have some potential, but
there is clearly much left to be understood. What is the right way to define strong truthfulness?
What mechanisms achieve optimal relative strong truthfulness? What is the tradeoff between the
“strength” of the truthfulness and the social welfare that can be achieved?
We explored a new utility model for externalities in the context of mechanism design and
sought to design mechanisms that protect agents from these externalities. Our mechanism has
some externality-resistance, however, the externality parameters have to be extremely small in or-
der for our mechanism to be effective. Is it possible to do better? More concretely, our mechanism
tolerates externality parameters of value γ = O(1/n3). Are there mechanisms that tolerate higher
values of γ? In the opposite direction, can we show a bound on the maximum γ?
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What happens if we use a different solution concept? Also, while we chose to optimize for “base
utility”, that is not the only goal one might consider. One could optimize for social welfare with
respect to the externality modified utilities. To what extent is this possible? Is this a reasonable
goal? I.e., should the goal of the mechanism be to encourage spite?
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A Strong Truthfulness and Scoring Rules
In this appendix, we develop the connection between strongly truthful single-agent mechanisms and
“strongly proper” scoring rules [9, 6]. As mentioned above, this immediately relates strongly truthful
mechanisms to a host of seemingly unrelated problems.
A.1 The setting
We consider the following setting:
• There is a set of n+ 1 events, (call them events 0 through n) one of which will happen.
• The agent (forecaster) has a belief vector p as to which event will happen, where pi is the
probability that event i happens. p0 = 1−
∑
1≤i≤n pi.
• The mechanism takes as input a postulated belief vector p˜, and uses a scoring rule to determine
the “payments” or “scores”. Specifically, the scoring rule says for each outcome i, the “payment”
or “score” the agent gets is si(p˜).
• The agent proposes p˜ and obtains utility∑
0≤i≤n
pisi(p˜).
• The scoring rule is strictly proper if reporting p˜ = p strictly maximizes his utility.
A.2 Translating Mechanisms to Scoring Rules
Let M be a mechanism that takes as input an agent’s valuations x1, . . . , xn for n alternatives. We
assume xi ≥ 0 for all i and that
∑
i xi ≤ 1. The mechanism has allocation probabilities ai(x) and
a payment rule P (x).
We convert this to a scoring rule S(M) as follows: Given vector p representing the probabilities
p1, . . . , pn of outcomes (with p0 = 1−
∑
i pi), let si(p) = ai(p)− P (p), and let s0(p) = −P (p).
Proposition 1. If M is strictly truthful (i.e., it is strictly optimal to be truthful), then S(M) is
strictly proper.
Proof. By definition, the payoff to the agent when using the scoring rule and reporting p˜ is
∑
1≤i≤n
pisi(p˜) +
1− ∑
1≤i≤n
pi
 s0(p˜)
This is the same as
∑
1≤i≤n
pi (ai(p˜)− P (p˜))−
1− ∑
1≤i≤n
pi
P (p˜) =∑
i
piai(p˜)− P (p˜).
and thus the incentives for the scoring rule are identical to the incentives for the mechanism.
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A.3 Translating Scoring Rules to Mechanisms
Let S be a non-trivial scoring rule. We assume that the si’s are of bounded absolute value. We
show how to convert this to a mechanism:
Define the constants C0 and C as follows:
C0 = max
p
|si(p)− s0(p)|
and
C = max
p
∑
1≤i≤n
(si(p)− s0(p) + C0) .
Since the scoring rule is non-trivial, the payments (scores) are not constant and therefore C > 0.
Notice that si(p)− s0(p) + C0 ≥ 0 and that∑
i≤i≤n
(
si(p)− s0(p) + C0
C
)
≤ 1.
The mechanism M(S) is now defined as follows.
• The mechanism takes as input the values xi for each of the alternatives 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We assume
that xi ≥ 0 for all i and that
∑
1≤i≤n xi ≤ 1.
• Define ai(x) = (si(x)− s0(x) + C0) /C. As observed above,
∑
i ai(x) ≤ 1 and ai(x) ≥ 0.
• Define P (x) = − (s0(x) + (1−
∑
i xi)C0) /C
Proposition 2. If S is strictly proper, then M(S) is strictly truthful.
Proof. The utility of a player playing this mechanism and reporting x is(∑
i
xiai(x)
)
− P (x).
This is the same as ∑
i
xi
(si(x)− s0(x) + C0)
C
+
(s0(x) + (1−
∑
i xi)C0)
C
,
which is
∑
i
xi
(si(x) + C0)
C
+
(
1−
∑
i
xi
)
(s0(x) + C0)
C
.
If S is strictly proper then, it is strictly proper under the translation by C0 and scaling by C.
Thus the utility of the player in the mechanism is strictly maximized by reporting truthfully.
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A.4 Strong truthfulness
Let us define m(x)-strongly proper scoring rules as follows:
Definition A.1. A scoring rule with scores si(p) is m(p)-strongly proper if for every p, p˜
u(p,p) − u(p, p˜) ≥
1
2
m(p˜) ||p− p˜||2,
where
u(p, p˜) =
∑
i
pisi(p˜).
Theorem A.2. • Let M be an m(x)-strongly truthful mechanism. Then S(M) is an m(x)-
strongly proper scoring rule.
• Let S be an m(p)-strongly proper mechanism. Then M(S) is an m(x)/C strongly truthful
mechanism.
Proof. The first part is immediate from the fact that utilities are precisely preserved under the
transformation from mechanisms to scoring rules. For the second part, suppose that for scoring rule
S
uS(p,p)− uS(p, p˜) ≥
1
2
m(p˜) ||p− p˜||2,
Then by the construction above
uM(S)(x,x) − uM(S)(x, x˜) =
uS(x,x) − uS(x, x˜)
C
≥
1
2
m(x˜)
C
||x− x˜||2.
A.5 Application to some standard scoring rules
• Logarithmic scoring rule: the translation doesn’t work because C0 is unbounded.
• Quadratic scoring rule: si(p) = 1 + 2pi − ||p||
2. Then s1(p)− s0(p) = 2(p− (1− p)) = 4p− 2
which is between -2 and 2. Thus C0 = 2 and C = 4. This translates into a(x) = x, which has
m(x) = 1.
• Spherical scoring rule: si(p) = pi/||p||. Then s1(p)− s0(p) = (2p − 1)/
√
p2 + (1− p)2 which
is between -1 and 1. Thus C0 = 1 and C = 2. This translates into
a(x) =
1
2
+
2x− 1
2
√
x2 + (1− x)2
.
The m(x) value is half that of the spherical rule.
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